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Abstract: 
This paper focuses on managers' attributions of M&A performance. Our analysis indicates that 
there is a linear association between performance and attributions to cultural differences, which 
is moderated by prior experience. Furthermore, our results suggest that there is a curvilinear 
association between performance and attributions to managers' actions, but we found no support 
for the moderating effect of experience for this association. By substantiating these attributional 
tendencies, our results contribute to research on M&As and studies on attribution more 
generally. In particular, our study helps to put cultural differences in perspective and cautions 
researchers and practitioners alike to avoid simplistic explanations of M&A performance. 
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Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the key debates in research on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) focuses on the role of 
cultural differences. Scholars have examined the impact of organizational cultural differences on 
M&A performance (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Stahl, Mendenhall, and Weber, 2005; Stahl and 
Voigt, 2008) and, in international settings, the impact of national cultural differences (Calori, 
Lubatkin, and Very, 1994; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, and Jayaraman, 2009; Morosini, 
Shane, and Singh, 1998; Reus and Lamont, 2009; Weber, Shenkar, and Raveh, 1996). Most of 
this research tells the same story; cultural differences tend to have a negative impact on 
performance. Although some of the researchers found a positive impact (Morosini et al., 1998) 
or argued that cultural differences may provide both sources of value creation and obstacles to 
integration (Björkman, Stahl, and Vaara, 2007), the fact remains that cultural differences are 
usually associated by researchers and practitioners alike with disappointment and failure. 
In this paper, we want to add to this discussion by elucidating the attributional tendencies related 
to cultural differences and M&A performance. In a nutshell, we focus on the way in which 
success or failure is attributed to the actions of managers or to cultural differences. This is an 
important issue for several reasons. Cultural differences may serve as convenient targets for 
attribution—“easy explanations”—compared with other more complex causes of success. Thus, 
the focus on cultural differences alone can unduly simplify the ways in which we conceptualize 
the factors that explain success or failure (King et al., 2004). Moreover, attributions to cultural 
differences can be (mis)used as political tools for self-serving purposes. In particular, managers 
may be tempted to reduce their own responsibility for failure by “blaming” cultural differences; 
the opposite tendency can be expected in successful cases (Vaara, 2002). Methodologically, such 
attributional tendencies may create biases in research with significant implications for our 
knowledge of M&As (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Teerikangas and Very, 2006). 
To better understand these tendencies, we draw on attribution theory (Heider, 1958; 
Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1979). Attribution theory provides a useful theoretical basis for analysis of 
explanations of success and failure, and it has also been applied in management studies (Bettman 
and Weitz, 1983; Hayward, 2002; Hayward and Shimizu, 2006; Martinko, Harvey, and 
Dasborough, 2011; Nishii, Lepak, and Schneider, 2008). With a few exceptions (Billett and 
Qian, 2008; Vaara, 2002), research on M&As has, however, focused little attention on 
attributions. In particular, there is scant systematic evidence of the attributional tendencies 
associated with cultural differences. 
This leads us to formulate our research question as follows: Do managers' explanations of M&A 
performance reflect biases toward cultural differences and/or their own actions? In line with 
attribution theory, we first examine whether perceptions of failure lead to increasing attributions 
to cultural differences and whether perceptions of success increase attributions to management's 
actions. We then examine whether these tendencies could be curvilinear instead of linear, which 
would reflect biases in cases of both extreme success and failure. Finally, we focus on the 
question of whether the experience of previous M&As strengthens these tendencies. 
ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The relationship between performance and causal attributions 
Attribution theory aims to understand causal explanations for specific events and phenomena 
(Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967; Reisenzein and Rudolph, 2008; Weiner, 1979, 2008). It postulates 
that people have an ingrained need to understand and control their environments and thus try to 
develop causal explanations for significant events. The theory argues for a general tendency to 
attribute success to internal causes (people's own actions or abilities, i.e., causes controlled by 
the individual) and, correspondingly, a tendency to explain failure by reference to external 
causes (i.e., causes over which the individual has little control) (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1971). 
There are two explanations for such attribution biases. First, the psychological explanation states 
that organizational actors make causal attributions in order to protect their self-esteem, to 
maintain their sense of mastery over their environment, and to reduce cognitive dissonance 
(Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983). Second, the political 
explanation suggests that causal attributions are also utilized to enhance the esteem of actors by 
projecting a favorable self-image to others. For example, executives tend to take credit for 
corporate performance and blame outside events in the event of failure (Bettman and 
Weitz, 1983; Salancik and Meindl,1984). Similarly, board members tend to be divided on the 
basis of whether they are inside or outside board members; the former tend to attribute 
responsibility for negative performance to industry and market conditions, whereas the latter 
attribute it to top management (Schaffer, 2002). 
Management and organizational scholars have used attribution theory in various types of studies 
(Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Hayward, 2002; Hayward and Shimizu, 2006; Jordan and 
Audia, 2012; Mantere et al., 2013; Nishii et al., 2008). However, a recent review makes the point 
that this theory is still underutilized considering its potential and ability to explain important 
sociopsychological phenomena (Martinkoet al., 2011). We argue that this is especially true in 
research on M&As. While attributions have received little attention in studies of M&As, a few 
studies nevertheless provide interesting insights into attributions in general and attributions to 
cultural differences in particular. Hayward and Shimizu (2006) showed that managers are more 
likely to admit failure and divest a target unit when they can do so without incriminating 
themselves. Billett and Qian (2008) provided evidence of self-attribution biases and 
overconfidence in M&As. Their analysis suggested that if managers experienced success in prior 
M&As, they attributed it to their own ability even when it was due to chance; this made them 
overconfident, and could eventually result in negative outcomes in subsequent deals. 
Furthermore, Vaara (2002) demonstrated that managers use a number of discursive strategies to 
deal with the sociopsychological pressures related to success and/or failure; these include 
tendencies to attribute success to one's own actions and failure to cultural differences. 
Hence, although there are good reasons for expecting that the attributions by managers of 
success and failure in M&As are likely to reflect attributional biases, these tendencies need to be 
tested in a systematic way. Accordingly, we first propose that managers emphasize the 
importance of their own actions in successful cases and in turn downplay them in cases of 
failure. Our first hypothesis, therefore, states the following: 
Hypothesis 1a: M&A performance is positively associated with causal attributions to managerial 
agency. 
Second, we expect that managers attribute failure to cultural differences. We thus formulate our 
second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: M&A performance is negatively associated with causal attributions to cultural 
differences. 
While attribution research has emphasized the use of self-serving attributions to avert blame and 
to enhance self-confidence, recent studies have questioned the pervasiveness of self-serving 
attributions (Hodkins and Liebeskind, 2003; Lee and Robinson, 2000; Lee and Tiedens, 2001; 
Schlenker, Pontari, and Christopher, 2001; Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki, 2004). For 
instance, in their study of managers' accounts of negative outcomes (a hypothetical salary 
freeze), Lee and Robinson (2000) found that managers made more internal causal attributions to 
factors that were under their control (subject to their own effort and behavior) than to external 
factors that were not under their control (the situation). They argued that, in an organizational 
setting, individuals have multiple motivations that impact causal attributions. On the one hand, 
individuals are motivated to avert blame and to bolster their self-esteem in cases of failure. On 
the other hand, they also wish to project a sense of power and control. Attributing failure to 
internal rather than external factors bestows individuals with a sense of control over the situation, 
and reduces feelings of helplessness (Homsma et al., 2007). The need to project a sense of being 
in control to oneself and to others rather than one of being powerless can lead managers in cases 
of failure to make internal attributions to indicate that they can take charge of the situation and 
intervene in the future to improve the negative situation (Lee and Robinson, 2000; Lee and 
Tiedens, 2001). In contrast, external self-serving attributions can make the account-givers seem 
“deceptive, self-absorbed, and ineffectual; they are viewed as unreliable social participants with 
flawed character” (Schlenker et al., 2001: 15). 
These researchers have also reflected upon whether the nature of self-serving attributions is 
dependent on positions of different status (Lee, 1997; Lee and Robinson, 2000; Lee and 
Tiedens, 2001). More specifically, for actors in high-status roles the motivation to appear 
powerful and in control can be more salient than the need to avert blame, making them more 
likely to attribute failure to internal causes (Lee, 1997; Lee and Robinson, 2000; Lee and 
Tiedens, 2001). Hence, managers, knowing that their actions will be evaluated and assessed, may 
assume greater responsibility for extremely unsuccessful acquisitions. We suggest that the 
tendency to assume responsibility for failure will be strongest in extreme cases of significant 
underperformance, because in these situations the need of managers to project that they are in 
control and can take corrective action is strongest. In this situation, self-serving (external) 
attributions, for example, to cultural differences, are also more likely to be the subject of critical 
examination (Lee and Robinson, 2000), thereby posing the risk that managers will be perceived 
as powerless or ineffectual. Hence, we propose the following curvilinearity hypotheses. These 
represent competing hypotheses for the linear Hypotheses 1a and 2a presented earlier. 
Hypothesis 1b: There will be a U-shaped curvilinear relationship between managerial 
attributions of M&A performance to managerial actions such that attributions to managerial 
agency are highest at extremely high and low levels of performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: There will be an inverse U-shaped curvilinear relationship between managerial 
attributions of M&A performance to cultural differences such that attributions to cultural 
differences are lowest at extremely high and low levels of performance. 
The moderating impact of acquisition experience 
If and when these attributional tendencies characterize managers' explanations of success and 
failure—either linearly (Hypotheses 1a and 2a) or curvilinearly (Hypotheses 1b and 2b) as 
suggested in the above hypotheses—it is important to examine whether prior experience impacts 
these associations. Although experience can help to provide more nuanced explanations of 
success and failure and thus in principle mitigate biases, insights from attribution research 
suggest that the attributional tendencies may actually strengthen with experience as people learn 
to explain success and failure in particular ways. 
Studies indicate that attributions of success by individuals to their own ability tend to increase 
over time (Bandura, 1997; Schunk, 1994; Weiner, 1992). In particular, prior attributions of 
success to internal factors, such as skills and abilities, have been found to increase 
overconfidence (Duncan and McAuley, 1993; Schunk and Gunn, 1986; Weiner, 1992). For 
example, in educational research, it was found that students' attributions of performance tended 
to become more personally flattering and comforting as the school semester progressed (Arkin, 
Detchon, and Maruyama, 1981). Similarly, it was shown in finance that when analysts and 
managers experienced initial success, they tended to become overconfident in their subsequent 
entry and investment choices (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Hilary and Menzly,2006; Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005, 2008). In the M&A context, Billett and Qian (2008) found evidence indicating 
that managers with greater acquisition experience were more likely to attribute M&A success to 
internal factors, which increased their self-attribution biases and caused them to become 
overconfident. This line of reasoning is also supported by studies of learning in organization 
studies. In particular, March and Sutton (1997) argued that managers who make it to the top are 
likely to be biased about their experiences of success; this leads them to be overconfident about 
the impact of their own actions. As managers involved in M&As are usually top managers, they 
may be individuals who are especially likely to attribute success to internal causes; i.e., to 
explain successful acquisition with their own managerial action. 
Concerning external attributions, attributions of poor performance to external factors may also 
increase with experience. This is in line with attribution theory, according to which experience 
increases an individual's awareness about external factors that can potentially impact 
performance, thereby making these external factors more salient (Kelley, 1973). Accordingly, 
Smither et al. (1986) argued that as experience increases, actors develop an appreciation for the 
difficulties in the external environment and as a result make more external attributions; however, 
their results did not support this hypothesis. Mitchell and Kalb (1982) found that experience 
increased the tendency of supervisors to attribute failure to external factors (the work 
environment) because it made the impact of the work environment more salient to the 
supervisors. Furthermore, managers who experience repeated failures are likely to become 
increasingly defensive and make more external performance attributions in order to protect their 
self-esteem and persuade themselves that they should not be blamed (Brown, 1984). Building on 
the reasoning above, it can be expected that, in cases of poor M&A performance, managers with 
greater acquisition experience will be more likely to attribute failure to external factors because 
these factors are more salient to them and because external attributions protect their personal 
self-esteem and public image. Hence, we propose that managers with experience will be even 
more likely to attribute successes to their own actions and failure to cultural differences. 
Hypothesis 3a: A positive linear association between M&A performance and causal attributions 
to managerial agency will be stronger in acquisitions where the managers have greater prior 
experience. 
Hypothesis 4a: A negative linear association between M&A performance and causal attributions 
to cultural differences will be stronger in acquisitions where the managers have greater prior 
experience. 
The above argumentation assumes a linear relationship between M&A performance and 
attribution effects, in line with Hypotheses 1a and 2a. If the relationship is curvilinear, as 
suggested in Hypotheses 1b and 2b, we would expect experience to moderate the curvilinear 
relationship. We would still predict that, at a high level of performance, experience increases 
attribution to managerial action and decreases attribution to cultural differences because 
managers may become overconfident about their own influence (Billett and Qian,2008; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). However, in contrast to the linear hypotheses, at a low level 
of performance a curvilinear relationship would imply that attributions to manager's actions are 
high and attributions to cultural differences are low as managers take responsibility for cases of 
obvious failure in order to project a sense that they are responsible and in control (Lee, 1997; Lee 
and Robinson,2000; Lee and Tiedens, 2001). Prior research has not explicitly addressed this 
issue, but experience could accentuate this tendency as managers learn that they cannot escape 
taking responsibility for obvious failure. Accordingly, we present the following hypotheses for 
the possible moderating effect of experience in the case of the curvilinear relationship. 
Hypothesis 3b: A positive curvilinear association between M&A performance and causal 
attribution to managerial agency will be stronger in acquisitions where the managers have 
greater prior experience. 
Hypothesis 4b: A negative curvilinear association between M&A performance and causal 
attribution to cultural differences will be stronger in acquisitions where the managers have 
greater prior experience. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and data collection 
Our sample consists of Finnish acquirers and includes domestic and cross-border mergers based 
on a database maintained by the Finnish business magazine Talouselämä between 2001 and 
2004. Mergers were included only if the acquiring firm gained a controlling interest in the 
acquired firm and the acquired firm was valued at EUR 3 million or more. In order to obtain high 
quality responses, acquiring firm CEOs were contacted via telephone and asked to identify 
potential respondents who were involved at the time in the acquisition and were knowledgeable 
about it. Then a survey was mailed to the CEOs, who distributed it to the respondents that had 
been identified in the acquiring and acquired firms. The respondents included CEOs (42.7%), top 
managers (42.7%), and other members of the management group and board members (14.6%). 
The overall response rate was 20 percent, yielding a sample of 92 mergers (51 domestic and 41 
cross-border acquisitions in 22 countries). The cross-border acquisitions included the following 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Hong Kong, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Ten firms returned responses from multiple 
respondents. Based on the cases from which we received multiple answers, the interrater 
reliability was checked, yielding significant intraclass correlation scores for most cases 
(p < 0.05). Two nonsignificant cases were removed to improve reliability (Calori et al., 1994). 
Potential nonresponse biases were checked using acquisition size and time elapsed after the 
acquisition, as these factors may influence managers' perceptions (Dundas and 
Richardson, 1982). T-tests of mean differences were not significant, indicating that there was no 
nonresponse bias. The domestic and cross-border samples were also compared. T-tests of the 
mean differences for all variables were nonsignificant across the two samples. 
Procedural measures were taken in the study's design to reduce the risk of common method bias. 
The questionnaire was pretested on a group of professors and managers, and necessary changes 
were made to reduce item ambiguity (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In addition, questions regarding 
both the dependent and independent variables and the control variables were spread out among 
other questions (not all of which are used in this study) (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
statistical remedies were used to rule out a significant common method bias. A Harman's one-
factor test, which consists of an unrotated exploratory factor analysis, was conducted. Several 
factors emerged from the analysis; no single factor accounted for a majority of the covariance 
among the items, and the first and second factors showed relatively low levels of variance (21% 
and 19%). This suggested the absence of any serious common method bias (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). In addition, following Spector (2006), we examined correlations between the items in 
the survey. If the self-report survey had introduced a shared bias into the items, one should have 
been able to establish a baseline level of significant correlations between all variables. We 
established 253 insignificant pairs of correlations and 83 significant ones. Whereas some level of 
correlation between the items was expected, the number of insignificant correlations was large 
enough to suggest a lack of universal bias. Finally, the statistical analyses that we conducted 
included complex (moderating, curvilinear) relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables. Because these relationships are unlikely to be part of the respondents' 
mental models, concerns regarding the existence of common method bias should be alleviated 
(Chang, Witteloostuijn, and Eden, 2010). 
Measures 
Independent variable 
Acquisition performance 
This variable consisted of four items that measured the outcome of the acquisition and the 
integration process. In line with prior studies of M&As, we used managerial evaluations of 
acquisition performance (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Datta, 1991; Very, Lubatkin, and Calori, 1996; 
Very et al., 1997). This approach is in line with the essence of attribution research where 
perceptions rather than, for example, “objective” assessments are the core of attributional 
analyses (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 2008). First, respondents were asked to indicate how well the 
(1) acquisition, and (2) integration process had succeeded. Second, respondents were asked how 
the (1) acquisition, and (2) integration process had succeeded compared with expectations. The 
scale ranged from 1 = total failure to 7 = great success. 
To examine any consistent bias between objective and subjective performance measures, we 
collected objective performance data. Financial statements were available for 43 publicly listed 
companies, which represented 47.8 percent of our sample. Objective performance, measured as 
the acquirer's ROI after the acquisition (in 2005), correlated positively and significantly with our 
subjective acquisition performance measure. Also, the objective performance measure was 
significantly correlated in the expected direction (negatively) with the measure “attribution to 
cultural differences” and (positively) with “attribution to managers” actions' (Hypotheses 1a and 
2a). This provides further validity for our subjective performance measure. 
Moderating variable 
Personal acquisition experience 
We measured personal acquisition experience by combining the number of acquisitions in which 
the respondent had been personally involved (1) on the acquiring firm side, and (2) on the 
acquired firm side. This sum index represented the person's combined prior experience of 
acquisitions. 
Dependent variables 
Attribution to managers' actions 
We followed the example of previous studies in measuring attributions based on the respondents' 
perceptions (De Michele et al., 1998; Duval and Silvia, 2002; Greenlees et al., 2007; Harvey and 
Martinko, 2009; Schaffer, 2002). Regarding attribution to managers' actions, we therefore asked 
respondents to rate their perceptions based on the extent to which management's actions (1) had 
affected the outcome of the integration process, and (2) explained the overall success of the 
acquisition. The scale ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 = a great deal. 
Attribution to cultural differences 
Following this logic, we asked respondents about the extent to which they perceived that cultural 
differences (1) had affected the outcome of the acquisition's integration process, and (2) 
explained the overall success of the acquisition. The scale ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 = a 
great deal. 
Control variables 
Organizational cultural differences 
To control for the effect of actual cultural differences on the attributions, we included both 
organizational and national cultural differences in our models. Following the example of 
previous studies (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Weber et al., 1996), we asked managers to report 
organizational cultural differences prior to the acquisition in the following areas: management 
and control, sales and marketing, production, research and development, and company values in 
general. The scale ranged from 1 = no differences to 7 = significant differences. 
National cultural differences 
We controlled for national cultural differences by building a construct of the variance-adjusted 
sum of differences between the two acquisition parties (Kogut and Singh, 1988) based on the 
nine dimensions of the GLOBE practices scores (House et al., 2004).1 
Degree of integration 
To control for the impact of managers' actions in postacquisition integration (Weber et al., 1996), 
we asked respondents to assess the degree of integration between the acquirer and the target in 
the following functions: management and control, sales and marketing, production, research and 
development. The scale ranged from 1 = no integration to 7 = total integration. 
Respondent involvement 
The participation of a respondent in the acquisition and integration decisions may bias his/her 
opinion of the acquisition outcome and the factors that contributed to it (Billett and Qian, 2008). 
We controlled for this by measuring the respondent's involvement in the decision making leading 
to the acquisition and in the integration of the companies. The scale ranged from 1 = not at all to 
7 = yes, as a central decision maker. 
Acquisition size 
We included the size of the acquisition as a control variable in line with prior acquisition studies 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Morosiniet al., 1998). Acquisition size was measured as the 
target's net sales at the time it was acquired and was reported in the business magazine 
Talouselämä. 
Time elapsed 
Acquisition dynamics can be influenced by the time elapsed since the acquisition. Following the 
approach by Very et al. (1997), we measured the number of years that had passed after the 
acquisition (one to four years). This external measure was based on the information in the 
business magazine Talouselämä. 
RESULTS 
Pretests of the questions with professors and managers supported the face-validity of the 
constructs. To further evaluate the reliability and validity of our items and constructs, we used 
confirmatory factor analysis with partial least squares (PLS) analysis, which is a structural 
equation modeling approach particularly applicable for smaller sample sizes. We followed the 
instructions of Shook et al. (2004) for evaluating the results of the confirmatory factor analysis. 
First, we examined the variable loadings, their t-values and corresponding significance levels (p-
values) and verified that all of them were significant (see Table 1). Then, we examined the 
reliability of the constructs. Cronbach's alphas all exceeded the commonly used threshold of 0.7. 
However, Cronbach's alphas have several limitations. Hence, following the recommendation of 
Shook et al. (2004), we calculated the composite reliabilities for each construct, all of which 
were above the limit of 0.7, with each indicator reliability above 0.5. To establish convergent 
validity, we calculated the average variance extracted, which exceeded 50 percent (Shook et 
al., 2004). The convergent validity was also supported by examination of an item-to-item 
correlation table that showed that the items correlated highest with other items belonging to the 
same construct. Discriminant validity was assured by calculating the shared variance between 
each pair of constructs and confirming that it was lower than the square root of the average 
variance extracted for each individual construct (Shook et al., 2004). 
Table 1. Item factor loadings, indicator reliability, construct validity, and reliability 
Construct Measurement 
item 
Factor 
loading 
Indicator 
reliability 
t-value Composite 
reliability 
Average 
variance 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Acquisition 
performance 
Acquisition 
outcome 
0.868 0.753 20.779*** 0.952 0.831 0.933 
  Integration 
outcome 
0.918 0.843 49.319***       
  Success of the 
acquisition 
0.920 0.846 40.796***       
compared with 
expectations 
  Success of the 
integration 
compared with 
expectations 
0.940 0.883 55.336***       
Attribution to 
managers' 
actions 
Extent to which 
managements' 
actions affect 
integration 
0.928 0.861 23.315*** 0.925 0.861 0.839 
  Extent to which 
managements' 
actions explain 
acquisition 
success 
0.928 0.861 26.958***       
Attribution to 
cultural 
differences 
Extent to which 
cultural 
differences affect 
integration 
0.929 0.863 14.826*** 0.885 0.794 0.747 
  Extent to which 
cultural 
differences 
explain 
acquisition 
success 
0.852 0.726 7.700***       
Organizational 
cultural 
differences 
Management and 
control 
0.861 0.742 4.314*** 0.894 0.629 0.859 
  Sales and 
marketing 
0.808 0.652 4.195***       
  Production 0.741 0.549 3.435***       
  Research and 
development 
0.737 0.543 3.050***       
  Company values 
in general 
0.811 0.658 4.690***       
Degree of 
integration 
Management and 
control 
0.819 0.671 9.738*** 0.938 0.792 0.912 
  Sales and 0.889 0.790 10.314***       
marketing 
  Production 0.925 0.855 10.888***       
  Research and 
development 
0.922 0.849 12.373***       
Participation Preacquisition 
stage 
0.882 0.778 8.942*** 0.890 0.802 0.755 
  Postacquisition 
stage 
0.909 0.826 15.458***       
*** p < 0.001. 
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelation coefficients of the study 
measures. On the whole, these relationships are in line with our hypotheses. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Varia
ble 
M
in 
Ma
x 
Me
an 
S. 
E. 
me
an 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1
3 
1. 
Acquis
ition 
size 
3.
00
0 
270.
000 
31.
249 
5.8
36 
1             
2. 
Time 
elapse
d 
1.
00
0 
4.00
0 
2.4
00 
0.1
22 
0.0
02 
1            
3. 
Respo
ndent 
involv
ement 
1.
00
0 
7.00
0 
5.8
07 
0.1
72 
−0.
125 
−0.
04
2 
1           
4. 
Acquis
ition 
experi
ence 
0.
00
0 
70.0
00 
6.4
45 
1.2
60 
0.0
23 
0.1
69 
0.0
49 
1          
5. 
Degre
e of 
1.
00
0 
7.00
0 
4.9
52 
0.1
78 
−0.
097 
0.0
32 
0.0
87 
−0.0
24 
1         
integra
tion 
6. 
Organi
zation
al 
cultura
l 
differe
nces 
1.
00
0 
7.00
0 
4.8
17 
0.1
43 
−0.
088 
−0.
10
0 
0.1
61 
−0.1
23 
−0.0
15 
1        
7. 
Nation
al 
cultura
l 
differe
nces 
0.
00
0 
18.8
53 
2.8
13 
0.5
26 
0.1
70 
0.0
69 
−0.
181 
0.04
1 
−0.0
99 
−0.
031 
1       
8. 
Perfor
mance 
1.
00
0 
7.00
0 
5.2
24 
0.1
36 
−0.
110 
−0.
00
5 
−0.
006 
0.23
2* 
0.34
9** 
−0.
267
* 
−0.
08
1 
1      
9. 
Attrib
ution 
to 
manag
ers' 
actions 
1.
00
0 
7.00
0 
3.7
14 
0.1
48 
0.0
22 
−0.
09
3 
0.2
07 
−0.0
28 
−0.0
85 
0.1
81 
−0.
15
2 
−0.3
15** 
1     
10. 
Attrib
ution 
to 
cultura
l 
differe
nces 
3.
00
0 
7.00
0 
5.6
10 
0.0
97 
−0.
228
* 
0.0
11 
0.2
74*
* 
0.01
4 
0.26
1* 
0.1
20 
−0.
16
9 
0.29
2** 
0.0
65 
1    
11. 
Square
d 
perfor
mance 
1.
00
0 
49.0
00 
28.
878 
1.2
84 
−0.
109 
−0.
04
7 
0.0
87 
0.03
9 
−0.2
70*
* 
0.1
00 
−0.
04
4 
−0.5
51**
* 
0.1
47 
0.1
36 
1   
12. 
Perfor
mance 
0.
00
490.
000 
38.
702 
8.7
95 
−0.
032 
0.1
13 
0.0
81 
0.86
3**
−0.0
41 
−0.
093 
−0.
01
0.03
1 
−0.
05
−0.
01
0.1
79 
1  
× 
acquisi
tion 
experi
ence 
0 * 8 3 4 
13. 
Square
d 
perfor
mance 
× 
acquisi
tion 
experi
ence 
0.
00
0 
343
0.00
0 
237
.58
4 
60.
34
0 
0.0
15 
0.0
87 
−0.
005 
0.89
3**
* 
0.02
9 
−0.
207 
0.0
25 
0.32
1** 
−0.
07
2 
−0.
01
8 
−0.
08
3 
0.86
3**
* 
1 
All two-tailed tests. N = 90, missing values were replaced with mean. Pearson's bivariate 
correlations in the table represent standardized beta coefficients. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; 
***p < 0.001. 
We used hierarchical regression analyses to test our results. We first examined the relationship 
between M&A performance and attributions to managers' actions (see online supporting 
information Table S1“Linear Model: Attribution to Managers' Actions”). The first-order term 
ofperformance was positively and significantly related to causal attributions to managers' actions 
(β = 0.275, p < 0.05). When the second-order term of performance was added, the first-order term 
remained significant (β = 0.547, p < 0.001) and the second-order term was also positive and 
significant (β = 0.299, p < 0.001, see Table 3, “Curvilinear Model: Attribution to Managers 
Actions”). These coefficients imply a curvilinear, nonmonotonic relationship between 
performance and attributions to managers' actions (Barnett and Salomon, 2006) and indicate that 
the relationship is better represented with a curvilinear than a linear distribution. A significant 
increase in the model fit after the curvilinear term was added (ΔR2 = 0.125, p < 0.001) further 
supports the curvilinear effect. Hence, Hypothesis 1b was supported while Hypothesis 1a was 
not supported. To examine the curvilinear effect further, we depicted the curve as shown in 
supporting information Figure S1. The curve illustrates that attributions to managers' actions 
decline at first as performance increases reaching a minimum at a performance level of 4.0 (on a 
scale of 1 to 7), but then increase continuously. Also, attributions to managers' actions are even 
stronger at very high levels of performance than at very low levels of performance. In other 
words, we found a significant positive association between managers' attributions to their own 
actions at low and high levels of performance with the association being even stronger at high 
levels. Of the control variables, respondent involvement was significantly related to attribution to 
managers' actions (β = 0.189, p < 0.05). 
Table 3. Regression analyses 
  Curvilinear model: 
attribution to 
managers' actions 
Curvilinear model: 
attribution to cultural 
differences 
Curvilinear 
moderation: 
attribution to 
managers' actions 
Linear moderation: 
attribution to cultural 
differences 
Variabl
es 
Beta t Si
g. 
VI
F 
Beta t Si
g. 
VI
F 
Beta t Si
g. 
VI
F 
Beta t Si
g. 
VI
F 
Acquisit
ion size 
−0.0
47 
−0.
563 
0.5
75 
1.1
16 
0.01
8 
0.1
90 
0.8
49 
1.1
16 
−0.0
49 
−0.
582 
0.5
62 
1.1
18 
0.00
5 
0.0
58 
0.9
54 
1.0
86 
Time 
elapsed 
0.07
0 
0.8
62 
0.3
91 
1.0
61 
−0.0
79 
−0.
862 
0.3
91 
1.0
61 
0.06
3 
0.7
60 
0.4
50 
1.0
97 
−0.0
92 
−1.
025 
0.3
08 
1.0
61 
Respon
dent 
involve
ment 
0.18
9* 
2.0
40 
0.0
45 
1.0
87 
0.16
9 
1.6
16 
0.1
10 
1.0
87 
0.18
5 
1.9
83 
0.0
51 
1.0
95 
0.17
2 
1.6
97 
0.0
94 
1.0
84 
Acquisit
ion 
experien
ce 
−0.1
26 
−1.
297 
0.1
98 
1.1
78 
0.08
4 
0.7
70 
0.4
44 
1.1
78 
−0.0
35 
−0.
162 
0.8
72 
5.8
21 
0.50
2* 
2.2
46 
0.0
27 
5.1
57 
Degree 
of 
integrati
on 
0.16
4 
1.6
44 
0.1
04 
1.1
91 
0.00
0 
−0.
001 
0.9
99 
1.1
91 
0.16
6 
1.6
52 
0.1
03 
1.1
93 
0.03
1 
0.2
78 
0.7
82 
1.1
92 
Organiz
ational 
cultural 
differen
ces 
0.20
4 
1.8
84 
0.0
63 
1.1
48 
0.06
7 
0.5
50 
0.5
84 
1.1
48 
0.19
4 
1.7
56 
0.0
83 
1.1
88 
0.04
6 
0.3
89 
0.6
98 
1.1
53 
National 
cultural 
differen
ces 
−0.0
57 
−0.
428 
0.6
69 
1.0
80 
−0.2
21 
−1.
479 
0.1
43 
1.0
80 
−0.0
58 
−0.
439 
0.6
62 
1.0
81 
−0.2
48 
−1.
697 
0.0
94 
1.0
86 
Perform
ance 
0.54
7*** 
4.4
29 
0.0
00 
1.9
50 
−0.3
77** 
−2.
700 
0.0
08 
1.9
50 
0.55
1*** 
4.4
26 
0.0
00 
1.9
56 
−0.4
25** 
−3.
464 
0.0
01 
1.5
82 
Squared 
perform
ance 
0.29
9*** 
3.9
38 
0.0
00 
1.6
36 
−0.0
64 
−0.
745 
0.4
59 
1.6
36 
0.29
3*** 
3.7
83 
0.0
00 
1.6
83 
        
Squared 
perform
ance × 
acquisiti
                −0.0
70 
−0.
469 
0.6
40 
5.7
94 
        
on 
experien
ce 
Perform
ance × 
acquisiti
on 
experien
ce 
                        −0.4
25* 
−2.
203 
0.0
30 
4.7
64 
R2 0.35
7 
      0.18
2 
      0.35
9 
      0.22
4 
      
Adjuste
d R2 
0.28
5 
      0.09
0 
      0.27
8 
      0.13
6 
      
R2 chan
ge 
0.12
5 
      0.00
6 
      0.00
2 
      0.04
7 
      
F 4.94
1*** 
      1.40
9 
      4.42
5*** 
      2.55
9* 
      
All two-tailed tests. N = 90, missing values were replaced with mean. Data in the table represent 
standardized beta coefficients. Dependent variables: attribution to managers' actions, attribution 
to cultural differences. The results are robust to nested models. See the online supporting 
information for the results of the simpler models. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
Then, we tested the relationship between M&A performance and attributions to cultural 
differences (see Table S1). The first-order independent variable performance showed a negative 
and statistically significant relationship with attribution to cultural differences (β = − 
0.319, p < 0.01). The second order term of performance (performance squared) was not 
significant (“Curvilinear Model: Attribution to Cultural Differences” in Table 3). Hence 
Hypothesis 2a proposing a negative linear relationship was supported while Hypothesis 2b 
suggesting a curvilinear relationship was not. None of the control variables were significantly 
related to attribution to cultural differences. We then proceeded to examine the moderating effect 
of experience. Since the association of M&A performance and attribution to managers' actions 
was curvilinear, we tested Hypothesis 3b (curvilinear moderation) with respect to attribution to 
managers' actions. Respectively, since the association of M&A performance and attribution to 
cultural differences was linear, we focused on Hypothesis 4a (linear moderation) with respect to 
cultural differences. To test curvilinear moderation in Hypothesis 3b, we included both the first 
and second order interaction terms performance × acquisition experience and performance 
squared × acquisition experience and tested their association with attribution to managers 
actions. The second order interaction terms were not significant, and therefore Hypothesis 3b 
was not supported (“Curvilinear Moderation: Attribution to Managers” Actions' in Table 3). 
To test Hypothesis 4a, we added the interaction term performance × acquisition experience and 
examined its relationship with attribution to cultural differences. The significant improvement in 
the new model (“Linear Moderation” in Table 3) compared with the initial linear model (see 
Table S1) (ΔR2 = 0.047, p < 0.05), and the negative interaction term (β = −0.425, p < 0.05) 
suggest a negative association between the interaction terms performance × acquisition 
experience and attribution to cultural differences. In Figure S2, we plotted the interaction effect. 
It shows that respondents who had been personally involved in a greater number of acquisitions 
were more likely to attribute low performance to cultural differences, thus supporting our 
Hypothesis 4a. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Conclusions and contributions 
In this paper, we have examined managers' tendencies to attribute M&A performance to 
managerial actions and cultural differences. In short, our results suggest that there is a curvilinear 
association between performance and attributions to managers' actions, but we found no support 
for the moderating effect of experience. Our findings also indicate that there is a linear 
association between performance and attributions to cultural differences, which is moderated by 
prior experience. 
By substantiating these attributional tendencies, our results make a significant contribution to 
M&A research. It is important to better understand how managers and researchers alike make 
sense of M&A performance and use factors such as cultural differences in their explanations of 
success or failure. Moreover, our analysis elucidates the specific nature of these attributions and 
suggests that tendencies to attribute performance to cultural differences and managers' own 
actions are indeed somewhat different. The findings concerning the attributions to cultural 
differences support the contention that managers are likely to blame cultural differences for 
failure. While this result could be expected on the basis of attribution theory, it has major 
implications for research on M&As as it suggests that managers may use cultural differences as 
convenient attribution targets. Moreover, we found that prior experience strengthens the 
association of failure with cultural differences. This is an interesting result; it suggests that 
managers can “learn” to explain failure with cultural differences, which carries with it a risk of 
using cultural differences as easy explanations and scapegoats. Thus, “cultural differences” may 
serve as a convenient attribution target for less successful M&As, and managers may become 
increasingly skilled at using the rhetoric of cultural differences as they become more experienced 
with acquisitions. This may result in an overemphasis on cultural factors when explaining 
success and failure (Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Vaara, 2002) and even a lack of appreciation 
for the complex cultural dynamics of M&As (Clark et al., 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2011). 
Interestingly, the results concerning the attributions to managers' actions tell a somewhat 
different story. Our results suggest a positive curvilinear relationship between M&A 
performance and attributions to managers' actions. In other words, managers tend to attribute 
extreme cases of both success and failure to their own actions. Thus, managers are likely to take 
credit for success, which may among other things lead to an illusion of control or to 
overconfidence. Such an illusion of control can be dangerous when managers confront the 
complex challenges of M&A processes (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) and may even partially 
explain the willingness to engage in risky M&As and “merger frenzy” (Billett and Qian, 2008). 
However, our curvilinear findings also suggest that managers do attribute extreme cases of 
failure to their own actions. In such cases, managers may need to project a sense of control both 
to themselves and others (Schlenker et al., 2001). The strength of managerial attributions was, 
however, unaffected by experience. 
By highlighting these attributional tendencies, our analysis has implications for the discussion 
concerning the conceptualization and measurement of cultural differences (Ailon, 2008; Berry, 
Guillén, and Zhou, 2010; Boyacigiller et al., 1996; Harzing, 2003; Shenkar, 2001,2012a,b). On 
the one hand, our results point toward the importance of using and developing more objective 
and comprehensive measures of cultural differences. For example, researchers can use 
multisource and multilevel research designs where (prior) organizational cultures are measured 
by groups of lower-level employees previously employed by the independent organizations. In 
this case, employees' perceptions would be less likely to be biased due to factors related to their 
prestige and/or self-esteem. Cultural differences could then be operationalized as differences 
between the perceptions of these groups. The above could be complemented with analyzing 
differences in perceptions between lower-level employees and higher-level managers. On the 
other hand, our results caution researchers not to rely overly on any static measure of cultural 
differences. In the worst case, the result may be myopia or, in other words, systematic 
overestimation of the impact of culture on different organizational phenomena such as M&A, 
FDI, and entry mode choice (Harzing, 2003). In light of this debate, our analysis provides 
additional grounds for developing new kinds of conceptualizations of cultural dynamics. These 
can include quantitative analyses of convergence or crossvergence in cultural differences (Sarala 
and Vaara, 2010) or qualitative analyses of cultural identity formation (Clark et al., 2010; 
Maguire and Phillips, 2008; Riad and Vaara, 2011; Vaara and Tienari, 2011). 
Our findings also contribute to research on attributions more generally. Applying insights from 
attribution theory to M&As is important per se—and consistent with the recent reviews of 
attribution theory in management studies (Martinko et al., 2011). Furthermore, our findings 
concerning the role of experience and curvilinear relationships may have broader implications 
for research on attributions. While studies of attributions indicate that experience may strengthen 
attributional tendencies, systematic analyses have been scarce. One interpretation of the results is 
that experience may indeed imply learning of a specific kind, i.e., learning to use particular—in 
our case, cultural—language to explain failure. It would be interesting to examine such 
phenomena more closely in future studies; this could include analysis of whether and how 
previous experiences of success or failure make a difference for future attributions. Our findings 
concerning curvilinearity can in turn complement recent studies suggesting a more complex and 
nuanced understanding of self-serving attributions (Hodkins and Liebeskind, 2003; Lee and 
Robinson, 2000; Lee and Tiedens, 2001; Schlenker et al., 2001; Tomlinson et al., 2004). The 
curvilinear nature of the association of performance and attributions with managers' actions may 
provide a new piece of the puzzle in attribution research—or at least pave the way for new 
studies examining and testing such curvilinearity. Based on our findings, it seems that managers 
may need to project a sense of control both to themselves and others, which requires assuming 
not only credit for success but also responsibility for clear cases of failure. 
Our findings also have practical implications. Practitioners should beware of the attributional 
tendencies that seem to characterize M&As. In particular, there is a need to pay attention to self-
serving attributions and the resulting illusion of control that could lead to overly risky deals and 
create problems in the management of the integration process. Special attention should be 
focused on how managers may overemphasize the role of cultural differences and even 
deliberately blame cultural differences for failure. At the same time, other causes of integration 
problems might pass unnoticed and be left unaddressed. Furthermore, the “negative” 
connotations of cultural differences may cause the management to overlook the potential value 
embedded in cultural differences (Björkman et al., 2007; Morosini et al., 1998; Reus and 
Lamont. 2009; Stahl and Voigt, 2008) or even shy away from potentially attractive acquisitions 
in the presence of apparent cultural differences. 
Boundary conditions and limitations 
The boundary conditions of our study should be taken seriously when interpreting these findings. 
Our analysis is based on a sample of Finnish companies' acquisitions made during a specific 
period. Thus, our results may be influenced by the characteristics of Finnish firms and this time 
period. For example, the Finnish economy has been historically driven by the pulp and paper and 
metal sectors. It could be that attribution effects are more salient in these types of “traditional” 
industries where Finns consider themselves to be proficient and have a national heritage. While 
we tested our model for some of the peculiarities of the Finnish context (e.g., main traditional 
industries) and found our results to be unaffected, it would be important to examine attributional 
tendencies in other national and cultural contexts (Morris and Peng, 1994). Furthermore, it may 
be that the specific time period emphasizes tendencies that could be different in other 
circumstances. Thus, it would be interesting to compare attributional tendencies for example in 
times of boom and bust. 
Our study is based on top managers' perceptions. While it is important to examine key decision 
makers' interpretations, it is possible that employees, managers of other companies, experts such 
as consultants or financial analysts, or the media might manifest other tendencies. An analysis 
and comparison of various groups' attributional tendencies would be a major issue for future 
research. Such studies could also go further in analysis of agreement and disagreement as well as 
criticality. 
Our analysis is largely, but not entirely, based on survey data. Although, for example, the 
national cultural difference measures were based on external data, our results may involve a risk 
of common method variance. However, the fact that our tests did not indicate any such bias 
should alleviate this concern. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to compare these results 
against an analysis where some of the measures were operationalized differently or drawn from 
other types of data. 
We relied on cross-sectional, perceptual measures, and thus cannot establish causal direction per 
se, which means that the risk of reverse causality must be kept in mind when interpreting our 
findings. In particular, it is important to focus attention on three key issues related to the role of 
cultural differences in our models. First, one could argue that managers' assessments of cultural 
differences might be affected by the attributional tendencies. The fact that our models include 
not only a measure of organizational cultural differences (based on the managers' own 
assessments) but also national cultural differences (based on external data) should alleviate this 
concern (see also the discussion about common method variance above). Second, one could raise 
the question of whether the results would reflect the actual impact of cultural differences on 
M&A performance; for instance, larger cultural differences would be reflected in poorer 
performance and thus in attributions to cultural differences. To deal with these concerns, we 
systematically controlled for the impact of cultural differences (both organizational and national) 
on the attributional tendencies in all our models. Third, our cross-sectional analysis cannot per se 
establish whether performance affects attributional tendencies or vice versa. In our case, the 
assessments of performance could be influenced by the attributions to cultural differences. The 
fact that the financial performance measure (gathered on the basis of available data) correlated 
significantly and positively with the subjective assessments should at least partially alleviate this 
concern. Moreover, it is usually assumed in attribution research that people first make sense of 
success/failure to be able to then construct explanations (attributions). We think that this is also 
likely to be the usual process in the case of our analysis, especially because the managers first 
responded to questions about performance and only after that to the questions measuring 
attributions. Nevertheless, the exact process of making sense of performance and attributions 
may be more complicated than usually assumed; it may, for instance, be the case that managers 
in “normal circumstances” frame success/failure and develop explanations for it (attributions) in 
a process that involves the mutual reconstruction of both aspects of the association. Thus, we 
underscore the need for future studies using other types of research designs and performance and 
attributional measures to verify our propositions and elaborate on our findings. 
In all, the results of our analysis should be taken seriously by researchers and practitioners alike 
when making sense of performance in M&A and other contexts. While the specific features of 
our sample and other limitations of our study need to be taken into consideration, our analysis 
does indicate that attributional tendencies are likely to play an important role when explaining 
performance, with significant theoretical, methodological, and practical implications. Our study 
has provided intriguing results, but it also gives rise to a number of fascinating new questions 
and issues that warrant attention in future research on attributions in the M&A and other 
contexts. 
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